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Introduction
Activist investors typically propose major changes in the strategy, nancial policy, or busi-
ness operations of their target companies. However, incumbent managers and directors, who
often have their own agenda, can resist these proposals and defend themselves using poison
pills, staggered boards, dual-class structures, and other measures. Securities regulation and
disclosure requirements also limit the power of activists. In practice, activists rarely own a
controlling stake. Without control, activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies;
they must persuade the companys board of directors or the majority of shareholders that
adopting their proposals is in the best interests of the rm. Simply put, shareholder activism
requires communication.
Consistent with this idea, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) nd that in roughly
50% of the cases activist hedge funds declare their intention to communicate with the board/
management on a regular basis with the goal of enhancing shareholder value. Becht, Franks,
Mayer, and Rossi (2009), Becht, Franks, and Grant (2015), Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach
(1998), and Dimson, O¼guzhan, and Xi (2015), provide direct evidence on private communica-
tions (e.g., in-person discussions, telephone calls, or exchange of letters/e-mails) as a protable
and e¤ective form of shareholder activism. A survey by Deloitte (2015) nds that more than
60% of public company CFOs say activist shareholders have communicated directly with their
management. McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) survey institutional investors and nd
that 63% of them engaged in direct discussions with the management or the board of direc-
tors of their portfolio companies, mostly behind-the-scenes. As a whole, the evidence suggests
that private communications between investors and rms is an important corporate governance
mechanism, perhaps more important than previously thought.
The goal of this paper is to study the conditions under which communication is an e¤ec-
tive form of shareholder activism. What factors contribute to successful dialogues between
investors and rms? Under what circumstances will investors resort to more aggressive tactics,
and when will they choose to exit? Studying these questions is important for two di¤erent
reasons. First, it can provide guidelines for empirical research that seeks to directly investigate
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the relationship between the frequency of shareholder communications and the characteristics
of investors, boards, and rms. Second, the empirical literature on shareholder activism, with
the exception of the studies above, focuses on observable actions (e.g., proxy ghts). In general,
however, a decision to launch a public campaign reects a failure to engage with the board
behind-the-scenes. For example, in May 2012, the activist hedge fund Elliott Management
wrote a letter to board members of BMC Software: we initiated a dialogue with senior man-
agement about exploring pathways together to create greater value for stockholders. In turn,
BMC responded by issuing a press release and adopting a poison pill.1 Shortly after, Elliott
nominated directors and pushed for the sale of BMC which was acquired a year later. If the
dialogue with BMC had been successful, Elliott would not have launched a public campaign; its
engagement with BMC might have gone unnoticed. While instances in which investors take no
actions are consistent with failed activism,2 they are also consistent with e¤ective behind-the-
scenes communications. Therefore, understanding the conditions under which communication
is e¤ective, and its interaction with other governance mechanisms, can shed new light on the
interpretation of the existing empirical evidence.
To study this topic, I analyze a model of shareholder activism with strategic communication.
A public rm is controlled by its board of directors (he) who cares about shareholder value
but also has private benets from keeping the status quo (e.g., seeking the quiet life). The
rm has an activist investor (she) who has information the board does not have about the
consequences of changing the status quo (e.g., spinning o¤a division), which can either increase
or decrease shareholder value. The activist could be conicted with other shareholders of the
rm. Based on her private information, the activist sends the board a private message. The
message is non-veriable, which leaves room for manipulation. Formally, communication is
modeled as cheap-talk à la Crawford and Sobel (1982). The board can either accommodate
the activist or ignore her message. The activist observes the boards response and does one of
the following: (i) exit - sell her stake to an uninformed market maker; (ii) hold onto her shares
1https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/904495/000095014212001189/eh1200701_dfan14a.htm
2Some investors choose to exit if their ideas are rejected. For example, according to David Einhorn from
Greenlight Capital, When we o¤er companies private advice, they either take it, or they explain why they are
not going to take it... sometimes, we agree to disagree, and then decide whether to hold the stock or exit the
position.See David Einhorns Greenlight Capital 1Q Investor Letter(April 25, 2017) on activiststocks.com.
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without taking additional actions; (iii) voice - launch a public campaign to change the status
quo (e.g., lobby other shareholders and start a proxy ght). Launching a campaign is costly.
Importantly, it is successful only if other shareholders, who are otherwise uninformed, believe
it is in their best interests to support the activist. A successful campaign changes the status
quo (even if the board resists it) and imposes a cost on the board (e.g., directors are red).
The challenge of the activist in this model is to convince the board, who is biased and
uninformed, to change the status quo. In equilibrium, the board accommodates the activists
demand either because he is persuaded by her arguments that changing the status quo is in
the best interests of the rm, or out of fear that the activist will launch a successful public
campaign if her demand is ignored. Communication is e¤ective if the activist can use her
private information to inuence the boards decision in equilibrium.
The rst result shows that communication and voice are complements. Specically, com-
munication is more likely to be e¤ective in equilibrium if the activists threat of launching a
campaign is credible. Intuitively, the board can avoid the risk of having a public campaign
launched against him by accommodating the activists demand for a change. If the board per-
ceives the risk as too high, he will choose to listen. In turn, if the activist expects the board to
listen, she has stronger incentives to communicate rather than seeking confrontation. The ac-
tivists threat is more credible when rallying support from other shareholders is easier (e.g., the
shareholder base is non-dispersed and homogeneous), control is contestable (e.g., declassied
board, one class of shares, no supermajority provisions), or the reputational damage to target
board members from a successful campaign is more severe. The model predicts that these
factors contribute to more e¤ective communications. At the same time, the analysis shows
that the threat of launching a campaign is more credible when communication is e¤ective in
equilibrium. Intuitively, with e¤ective communication, the board learns about the intention of
the activist to act if she is ignored, and consequently, takes the threat more seriously.
The analysis of voice and communication demonstrates that a public campaign is a sign of
ine¤ective behind-the-scenes communications, and vice a versa. Therefore, factors that predict
high frequency of public campaigns would in fact suggest that the employed tactics are not
e¤ective enough to induce boards to comply with demands that activists make behind closed-
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doors. Without explicitly accounting for the possibility of unobserved communications, the
empiricist might reach the wrong conclusions.
Exit is an alternative mechanism to voice (Hirschman (1970)). Ceteris paribus, if the
activist can exit at better terms (i.e., receive a higher price for her shares), she has fewer
incentives to launch a public campaign; the activist can cut and run. In principle, if exit
had weakened the credibility of the activists threat to launch a campaign, a corollary of the
rst result would have suggested that exit also harms communication. Perhaps surprisingly,
the second result shows the opposite: communication is more e¤ective in equilibrium when
the activist can exit her position at better terms. That is, communication and exit can also
be complements. The activist is more likely to enjoy favorable terms of exit when short-term
capital gains taxes are low, anonymous trade is feasible (e.g., weak disclosure requirements
or fragmented market structure), adverse selection is mild (e.g., due to liquidity shocks, less
information is revealed by the activists trades), or the share is liquid. The model predicts that
these factors contribute to more e¤ective communications.
There are two di¤erent channels behind the result that exit enhances communications.
First, exit relaxes the tension between the activist and the board. To understand this channel,
recall the board is biased in favor of keeping the status quo. Therefore, the activist cannot
avoid exaggerating the benet of changing it. The board, who understands the motives of the
activist, is less likely to accommodate her demand. In equilibrium, the mistrust between the
two limits the ability of the activist to credibly reveal her private information, and as a result,
communication is ine¤ective. With exit, however, the activist insists on changing the status
quo only if the benet from doing so is higher than what she expects to get from selling her
shares. In other words, the activist has fewer incentives to exaggerate her private information.
As a result, the tension between the two is relaxed: the board is convinced that whenever the
activist demands a change, the benet to shareholders must be very high. In equilibrium, the
board has more incentives to accommodate the activists demand and communication is more
likely to be e¤ective.
Second, exit also enhances communication by increasing the credibility of the activists
threat to launch a successful public campaign. There are two forces in play. First, as the rst
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channel indicates, the activists demand to change the status quo is a stronger signal about
the benet of doing so when the activist faces better terms of exit. Therefore, conditional on a
demand for a change, the board expects the activist to be more determined and willing to act
if she is ignored. Second, recall that the success of a campaign is endogenous; it depends on the
beliefs of shareholders. If the activist starts a public campaign, she is e¤ectively deciding not to
exit. By putting her money where her mouth is, the activist demonstrates her strong belief
that a change to the status quo is required. As a result, shareholders are more condent that by
supporting the activist they are increasing the value of their shares, and the campaign is more
likely to succeed. This e¤ect is stronger if by campaigning the activist forgoes an opportunity
to exit at better terms. For both of these reasons, the activists threat is more credible if the
terms of exit are more favorable to her. This result reveals a novel channel of complementarity
between exit and voice. Since voice and communication are also complements (as suggested
by the rst result), this is another channel through which exit enhances communication.
Figure 1 - The e¤ect of voice and exit on communications
Figure 1 summarizes the interplay between voice, exit, and communications in this paper.
It shows that voice and exit have a positive direct e¤ect on communications: exit relaxes the
tension between the investor and the board, and voice introduces a threat that can induce the
board to comply with the activists demand. Figure 1 also illustrates the two indirect e¤ects
that exit has on communications, through its e¤ect on voice: while exit increases the incentives
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of the activist to cut and run, it also increases the likelihood that shareholders will support
her public campaign if she chooses to start one. As a whole, the analysis demonstrates that
the e¤ectiveness of these governance mechanisms cannot be studied in isolation.
Finally, I explore three extensions to the baseline model. First, I consider a setup in which
the activist can also send public messages that are observed by all market participants, not just
the board. I show that public communications are less e¤ective than private communications.
Intuitively, the temptation of the activist to use public messages to manipulate the stock
price harms her credibility, and as a result, limits her ability to inuence corporate policy.
This result is consistent with the prevalence of behind-the-scenes communications. Second, I
consider an extension in which the board is fully informed. In equilibrium, communication can
still be e¤ective, but only if the activist has private information about her private benets from
a change or her beliefs about its prospects (even if these beliefs are perceived as misguided
by the board). In these cases, the board learns about the activists resolve, and as a result,
decides how seriously to take her threat to launch a campaign if her demand is ignored. Third,
I endogenize the activists decision to become a shareholder. I show that while in equilibrium
the disclosure of the activists position alerts the market that the rm can potentially benet
from activism, it leaves room for communication since the activist still needs to convince the
board that this is indeed the case.
This paper contributes to the governance literature in several ways. Existing models share
the idea that large shareholders can unilaterally impose their view through direct interventions.3
By contrast, here the activist must convince the board or other shareholders that adopting her
proposal is in their best interests. As a result, the analysis provides novel predictions on
the factors that contribute to e¤ective communications between investors and rms. The
role of communication in corporate governance has been studied in the context of managerial
compensation (Almazan, Banerji, and Motta (2008)), optimal board structure (Adams and
Ferreira (2007), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2016), Harris and Raviv (2008), Levit (2017)),
3E.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Kyle and Vila (1991), Admati et al. (1994), Burkart et al. (1997), Maug
(1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Noe (2002), Aghion et al. (2004), and
Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), Edmans and Manso (2011), and Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015). See also
Edmans (2014) for a survey.
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takeovers (Levit (2016)), shareholder voting (Bhattacharya (1997) and Levit and Malenko
(2011)), and shareholder activism (Cohn and Rajan (2013), Harris and Raviv (2010)). Unlike
these studies, here the focus is on the interaction of shareholder communications (private and
public) with voice and exit. An important contribution of the paper is showing that both voice
and exit can improve the ability of investors to govern through communication. These aspects
also separate the paper from other models of communication. Indeed, here the alternative to
communication is itself endogenous: it depends on the markets expectations if the activist
chooses to exit and on shareholdersbeliefs if she resorts to voice.4 Finally, the e¤ect of exit in
this paper is di¤erent from existing models on governance through exit (Admati and Peiderer
(2009) and Edmans (2009)). In these models, the threat of exit disciplines the board/manager,
but only if his compensation is short-term. By contrast, my model does not require short-
term compensation. Since exit has no direct e¤ect on the boards payo¤, exit is not a threat.5
Instead, the decision not to exit increases the activists credibility when communicating with
the board or lobbying other shareholders to support her campaign. In this respect, the paper
also contributes to the literature on the real e¤ects of nancial markets by identifying a new
channel through which prices a¤ect rm value (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012)).
1 Setup of the baseline model
Consider a public rm whose value v(e; x) depends on action x 2 fL;Rg and random variablee. Random variable e has a continuous probability density function f with full support over
0; 

. I assume
v(e; x) =
8><>:
e if x = R
 if x = L:
(1)
4The paper is related to the literature on strategic communication with outside options. Unlike Che et al.
(2013), here it is the sender, not the receiver, who has the outside option. Unlike Levit (2017), Matthews
(1989), and Shimizu (2017), here the outside option has no direct e¤ect on the receivers payo¤, it depends on
the beliefs of a third party. Moreover, unlike Levit (2017), here the success of intervention (voice) is endogenous
and a commitment by the sender (investor) not to intervene is never optimal.
5It can be shown that with short-term compensation, the threat of exit and the threat of voice have a similar
e¤ect on communication.
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If x = L then the status quo remains and the long-term shareholder value is  2  0; . If
x = R then the status quo changes and the long-term shareholder value is e. Intuitively, there
is less uncertainty about rm value under the status quo than under a proposed change that is
yet to be implemented. The change can be a proposal to restructure the balance sheet, change
payout policy, sell under-performing and non-core assets, limit diversifying acquisitions, adopt
cost-cutting initiatives, cut R&D expenditures, exploit new growth opportunities, implement
tax e¢ ciency-enhancing proposals, and explore a sale of the company. The empirical studies
that are cited in the introduction suggest that these proposals are commonly stated as ob-
jectives by activist investors when they communicate with their portfolio companies. Either
way, shareholder value is maximized if action R is implemented when e >  and action L is
implemented otherwise. Hereafter, I use change (status quo) as a synonym for x = R
(x = L).
The action x is taken by the board of directors,6 whose preferences are represented by
!  v(e; x) +   1x=L; (2)
where ! > 0 and  > 0. The board prefers x = L if e <  + 
!
and x = R otherwise. I assume

!
<    , which guarantees that the boards preferences over x depend on e. I also assume
E[e ]  
!
, which guarantees that the board prefers the status quo based on his prior beliefs.
Parameter  is the bias of the board toward the status quo (e.g., avoiding the loss of perks or
empire building aspirations that are associated with downsizing the rm), whereas parameter
! is the relative weight the board puts on shareholder value due to compensation or career
concerns. The ratio 
!
captures the conict of interests between the board and the shareholders
that cannot be contracted away: if e 2 (;  + 
!
) then shareholders prefer x = R while the
board prefers x = L.
The ownership structure of the rm consists of passive shareholders (hereafter, shareholders)
who collectively own the majority of the voting rights. Their preferences are given by v(e; x).
Each share has one vote. The rm also has an activist investor (hereafter, investor) who
6I do not distinguish between insiders and independent directors.
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initially owns a fraction  2  0; 1
2

of all shares. As I describe below, the investor (she)
di¤ers from other shareholders in her expertise. The investors preferences are represented by
  v(e; x) +   1x=R; (3)
where  2 [0; ). The investor prefers x = L if e <    

and x = R otherwise. Assuming


<  guarantees that the investors preferences depend on the realization of e. Since   0,
the investor is biased toward a change relative to other shareholders. Parameter  captures
in a reduced form the conict of interests between the investor and other shareholders, which
could stem from a desire to establish reputation for having the expertise to inuence corporate
policy, di¤erent investment horizons, or di¤erent appetite for risk.
1.1 Information structure
The investor has information about e that the board does not have. Certainly, directors have
access to private information of the rm as an integral part of their job, but they are unlikely
to be fully informed. In some rms directors are too busy pursuing other activities (e.g.,
sitting on other rmsboards), or lack the incentives to learn because of their bias toward the
status quo. Directors may also su¤er from coordination problems within the board (e.g., free-
riding and group-think), have conicts with senior management who is their ultimate source of
information, or simply lack the required skills. On the other hand, activist investors routinely
conduct highly-detailed analysis of the target company and have a market-wide perspective on
assets valuation that corporate boards often lack. For simplicity, I assume the investor perfectly
observes e while the board and other shareholders and market participants are uninformed. In
Section 3.2, I consider information structure in which the board is fully informed about e and
the investor has other sources of private information.
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1.2 Sequence of events
1. Behind-the-scenes communication: Initially, the investor privately observes e, and
based on her private information, she sends the board a message m 2 0; . I denote by (e)
the message the investor sends conditional on e. In line with a standard cheap talk framework,
the investors information about e is non-veriable and the content of m does not a¤ect the
boards or the investors payo¤ directly. This assumption captures the forward-looking nature
of the investors information and the informal nature of communication between investors and
rms. Communication is private in the sense that no player other than the investor and the
board observes message m. This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.1.
2. Boards decision making: The board observes message m and then chooses between L
and R. I denote by x (m) 2 fL;Rg the boards decision conditional on m.
3. Exit: The investor privately observes the boards decision and then decides whether to exit
and sell her  shares (s = 1) or keep them (s = 0). With probability  2 (0; 1) the investor
is hit by a privately observed liquidity shock (e = 1) which forces her to sell her entire stake
(e.g., withdrawals from her end investors or an alternative investment opportunity). With
probability 1   the investor does not su¤er a shock (e = 0) and she is free to choose whether
to retain or sell her shares. e is independent of e. I use the terminology strategic exit ife = 0 and s = 1. To save on notation, I assume that e = 1 automatically implies s = 1.
The investor trades with a competitive and risk neutral market maker. As in Admati and
Peiderer (2009), the market maker observes the investors trading decision s, but nothing else
(specically, it does not observe m, x, e, or e). Conditional on s, the market maker quotes a
price, denoted by p (s), that is equal to the expected share value. Since p (0) will not play a
role in the analysis, hereafter, I refer to p (1) as p. Notice that under these assumptions, the
investor can exit before the boards decision is publicly announced or executed, but she cannot
hide her trades. As I show below, her decision to exit exerts a negative pressure on the stock
price.
4. Voice - launching a public campaign: If the investor does not exit (s = 0), she
can either remain passive (e = 0) or launch a public campaign to change the status quo
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(e = 1).7 If e = 1 then she incurs a non-reimbursable cost c > 0.8 Campaigning involves
lobbying other institutional investors, publicizing the investors demand through various media
outlets, submitting shareholder proposals, ling lawsuits, or starting a proxy ght to replace
the incumbent directors. All of these activities require resources, time, and e¤ort. Since
campaigning is more costly than directly communicating with the board, it is natural to assume
that the investor launches a campaign only after the communication stage.
The campaign can either succeed ( = 1) or fail ( = 0), as I describe below. If e = 0
or  = 0 then the initial decision of the board remains in place and rm value is realized
accordingly. If the investor launches a campaign and the campaign succeeds (e = 1 and  = 1),
the status quo changes, action R is implemented, and the board incurs an additional cost   0.
Intuitively, being forced by shareholders to accept the change harms directors reputation,
compensation, private benets, and may even cost their job. Importantly, the investor cannot
unilaterally change the status quo; she must get the support of other shareholders. I assume
that shareholders support the campaign if and only if the expected gains from changing the
status quo are larger than   0,
 = 1, E[e   je = 1]  : (4)
Intuitively, shareholders pay attention to the campaign (and support it) only if the conse-
quences of a change are signicant. Alternatively, unless the payo¤ from a change is high,
shareholders might not want to be portrayed as hostile to management, who prefers the sta-
tus quo. A larger  also captures in a reduced form the dispersion and heterogeneity of the
shareholder base, conicts among shareholders, and the boards entrenchment (e.g., dual class
shares, staggered board, supermajority provisions). All else equal, these factors are likely to
reduce the probability that the campaign succeeds.
7Since relative to the investor the board is biased against changing the status quo, the investor has no
incentives to launch a campaign to force the status quo. Moreover, assuming the investor cannot launch a
public campaign after exiting is unnecessary. By exiting, the investor reduces her stake and signals that e is
low. Both e¤ects harm the investors credibility, and therefore, her ability to win the support of shareholders.
8According to Gantchev (2013), the average cost of a US public activist campaign ending in a proxy contest
is $10.5 millions.
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5. Payo¤s are realized: Shareholder value is determined by the realization of e and the
eventual action that is implemented. Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of events.
Figure 2 - Sequence of events in the baseline model
Campaign fails
Firm value is realized based on the
board’s initial decision, x*
The status quo changes:
Firm value is realized based on x=R
Campaign succeeds
Behind-the-scenes communications: Investor sends the board a private message m
Investor observes the board’s decision x*
Investor privately observes
Board observes message m and decides on x*∈{L,R}
Investor holds onto her shares (s=1) and
launches a campaign (e=1)
Investor exits (s=1) or
remains passive (e=0)
1.3 Payo¤s
The board and the investor maximize their expected utilities, which are given respectively, by
uB(e; x; e; ) = !  v(e; x) +   1x=L  
8><>: if x = L and e =  = 10 else (5)
and
uI(e; x; e; s; ) = sp (s) + (1  s)
8><>:  v(
e; R) +    c if x = L and e =  = 1
  v(e; x) +   1x=R   e  c else.
(6)
13
Notice that the investor enjoys her private benets (e.g., getting credit for the change) only if
she did not exit. Also notice that if the campaign succeeds, the boards payo¤ is una¤ected
by the new strategy, he only su¤ers the disutility . This assumption ensures that the board
cannot benet from intervention.
1.4 Solution concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies of the game consists of (; x; s; p; e; )
and is dened as follows: (i) For any  2 0; , if () = m then m maximizes the investors
expected utility conditional on e =  and given (x; s; p; e; ), where the expectations are
taken with respect to e; (ii) If m is on the equilibrium path then x (m) maximizes the boards
expected utility given (; s; p; e; ), where the expectations are taken with respect to (e; e)
conditional on m; (iii) For any  2 0; ,  2 f0; 1g, and x 2 fL;Rg, strategies s and e
maximize the investors expected utility conditional on (e; e) = (; ) and given p and ; (iv)
For any s 2 f0; 1g ; the price-setting rule p (s) is the expected value of v(e; x) conditional on s
and given (; x; s; e; ); (v)  = 1 if and only if the expected value of e conditional on e = 1
(and therefore, s = 0) and given (; x; s; p; e) is greater than +. Finally, all players have
rational expectations in that each players belief about the other playersstrategies is correct in
equilibrium. Moreover, the players uses Bayesrules to update their beliefs whenever possible.
2 Analysis
The goal of the analysis is to derive the conditions under which communication is e¤ective in
equilibrium. Subsection 2.1 takes as given the investors message and presents several prelimi-
nary results. Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 characterize equilibria of the game in which communica-
tion is ine¤ective and e¤ective, respectively. Subsection 2.4 derives the comparative statics of
the model. All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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2.1 Preliminary results
I solve the model backward. Consider rst the conditions under which the investor launches a
campaign to change the status quo.
Lemma 1 (Public campaign) Suppose the board keeps the status quo (x = L) and the price
upon exit is p. The investor launches a campaign (s = 0 and e = 1) if and only if she does not
need liquidity (e = 0) and the following two conditions hold:
(i) The investor has incentives to launch a campaign if it is expected to succeed:
e > max f; pg    c

: (7)
(ii) Shareholders support a campaign to change the status quo:
E[e   je > max f; pg    c

]  : (8)
The investor launches a campaign only if the net benet from changing the status quo,
e +    c, is higher than max f; pg, the highest between the value of her shares under the
status quo and the price she expects the market maker to quote if she decides to exit and
sell these shares. Therefore, a campaign is launched only if (7) holds. Shareholders anticipate
the investors behavior and update their beliefs accordingly when a campaign is launched.
The campaign is successful only if conditional on e = 1 shareholders are persuaded that the
expected benet from a change is larger than , which gives condition (8).9
To ease the exposition, I abuse notation and dene
 (p) 
8><>:1 if E[
e   je > max f; pg    c

]  
0 else,
(9)
9Notice that if the investor expects shareholders not to support her campaign, she has no incentives to start
one (since c > 0). Therefore, e = 0 can always be supported as an equilibrium outcome if conditional on
e = 1 shareholderso¤-equilibrium beliefs about e are su¢ ciently low. In the proof of Lemma 1, I require these
o¤-equilibrium beliefs to satisfy the Grossman and Perry (1986) renement. Under this renement, the only
credible beliefs are e = 1) e > max f; pg    c .
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as the indicator for the support of shareholders for a campaign.
The next result characterizes the decision of the investor to exit strategically.
Lemma 2 (Strategic exit) Suppose the price upon exit is p. The investor exits strategically
(e = 0 and s = 1) if and only if one of the following conditions hold:
(i) x = R and e + 

 p.
(ii) x = L,   p, and either  (p) = 0 or e  p   c

.
Intuitively, if x = R then the board voluntarily changes the status quo and the investor
cannot (or does not want to) reverse this decision. The investor exits strategically as long as
the price she expects to get is higher than the share value plus her private benets. If the board
keeps the status quo, the investor will exit strategically if and only if the share is overpriced
(  p), and launching a campaign to change the status quo is either not feasible ( (p) = 0)
or does not justify itself (e  p   c

).
Finally, consider the boards decision to change the status quo after the investor sends
message m. The board trades o¤ his private benets  against two factors: (i) the expected
gains to rm value from a change, E[e  jm], and (ii) the risk that the investor would launch
a successful campaign if her demand for a change is ignored. Based on Lemma 1, the expected
disutility the board su¤ers from a campaign is   (1  )E[1e>maxf;pg   c

jm]   (p). The next
result follows directly from the comparison of these payo¤s.
Lemma 3 (Boards decision) Suppose the price upon exit is p and the investor sends mes-
sage m. Then, the board changes the status quo (x = R) if and only if
  E[h(e; p)jm]; (10)
where
h(e; p)  !(e   ) +   (1  )  1e>maxf;pg   c

  (p) (11)
is the boards net benet from a change in the status quo conditional on e.
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2.2 No communication
In a typical cheap-talk game, there always exists an equilibrium in which the board ignores all
messages from the investor, and these messages are uninformative. These equilibria are often
referred to as babbling equilibria, and their outcome is equivalent to assuming no communica-
tion between the investor and the board. These equilibria are important since if the conditions
I derive in Section 2.3 do not hold, every equilibrium of the game is a babbling equilibrium.
The next result characterizes the decision of the board and the price upon exit that emerge
in these babbling equilibria. Given these two endogenous variables, the investors decision to
launch a campaign and exit are described by Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria without communication)
(i) A babbling equilibrium with x = R exists if and only if  < E[h(e; N)]. In this equilib-
rium, p = N is the unique solution of
p =
E[e] + (1  ) Pr[e < p  

]E[eje < p  

]
 + (1  ) Pr[e < p  

]
: (12)
(ii) A babbling equilibrium with x = L exists if and only if E[h(e; )]  . In this equilibrium,
p = .
Without communication, the board makes decisions based on his prior about e. According
to Lemma 3, the board chooses x = R if and only if  < E[h(e; p)]. However, in equilibrium,
p depends on the market makers expectations of the boards decision and the investors exit
strategy. Suppose x = R. According to Lemma 2 part (i), the investor exits for two reasons.
Either because she needs liquidity (e = 1) or because the share is over-priced (e + 

 p).
In the former event the share value is E[e] and in the latter event it is E[eje < p   

]. The
expected share value conditional on exit is the weighted average of these two terms, which is
given by the right hand side of (12). In equilibrium, the market maker prices the share fairly.
Therefore, p must solve (12) and an equilibrium with x = R requires  < E[h(e; N)]. In this
equilibrium, the expected shareholder value is E[e]. Suppose x = L. If the investor does not
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exit, she may launch a campaign as described by Lemma 1. However, if the investor exits, the
status quo does not change and shareholder value is . Therefore, p =  and an equilibrium
with x = L requires E[h(e; )]  . In this equilibrium, the expected shareholder value is
 + (1  )  () Pr[e >     c

]E[e   je      c

]:10
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 show that without e¤ective communications, the investors
threat to launch a campaign may not be e¤ective. As a result, the investor is sometimes
required to exercise this threat in equilibrium. The next result immediately follows.
Corollary 1 Suppose  () = 1 and maxfE[h(e; );E[h(e; N)]g < . Then, in any babbling
equilibrium the board keeps the status quo (x = L) and the investor launches a campaign with
a positive probability.
2.3 Behind-the-scenes communications
With behind-the-scenes communications, the investor can potentially inuence the decision of
the board. Inuencing the board requires the investor to reveal information about e (i.e., send-
ing di¤erent messages for di¤erent realizations of e) and the board to use this information (i.e.,
making di¤erent decisions after observing di¤erent messages). Equilibria with this property
are called inuential. If the equilibrium is inuential then communication is e¤ective.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is inuential if there exist 0 6= 00 in the support of f () such
that (0) 6=  (00) and x ((0)) 6= x ((00)).
In equilibrium, di¤erent messages can potentially convey di¤erent information about e.
However, Denition 1 implies that in any inuential equilibrium we can classify messages on
the path into two disjoint sets: those messages that induce action x = R and those that induce
action x = L. Messages in the rst (second) set can be interpreted as demands (suggestions)
10If E[h(e; )] <  < E[h(e; N )] then multiple babbling equilibria exist. If E[h(e; N )] <  < E[h(e; )] then
a pure-strategy babbling equilibrium does not exist. In the Online Appendix I show that in this case there
exists a mixed-strategy babbling equilibrium. Moreover, if either E[e]  , (1  )=! is su¢ ciently small,
 () = 0, or f () has a non-increasing hazard rate, then there exists a non-babbling (inuential) pure-strategy
equilibrium. Under these assumptions, a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.
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from the board to change (keep) the status quo. Hereafter, I use the terminology demanding
the boardto describe the investors communication strategy.
If the equilibrium is inuential then the investor can a¤ect the boards decision by sending
the relevant message. Since communication is less costly than launching a campaign, the
investor has incentives to communicate rather than campaigning.
Lemma 4 A campaign is never launched on the path of an inuential equilibrium.
Combined with Corollary 1, Lemma 4 shows that a public campaign is an indication that
the communication between the investor and the board is not e¤ective.
To understand the conditions under which inuential equilibria exist, suppose rst that the
price upon exit is given exogenously by p. When the equilibrium is inuential, the investor can
always secure a payo¤ of maxfe+ 

; g by sending the relevant message. If maxfe+ 

; g >
p then the share is under-priced. If in addition e > max f; pg  

, then the investor has strict
incentives to hold onto her shares and demand a change. However, if instead maxfe+ 

; g <
p, then the share is over-priced and the investor is better o¤ exploiting her private information
by selling her shares. Since in this case the investor prefers an exit irrespective of the boards
decision, she is also indi¤erent with respect to her message to the board. In principle, this
feature of the model can generate many equilibria. However, if sending a message is costly,
even if the cost is arbitrarily small, the investor may choose not to send any message.
To ensure that the analysis is robust to this possibility, I assume that by sending a message
of any kind the investor incurs a xed cost " > 0. The investor can be silent, that is, she
can choose not to send any message to the board and avoid the messaging costs. Therefore,
without the loss of generality, there always exists one message which is costless. I focus on
inuential equilibria that survive "-perturbation of the model, that is, equilibria that survive
the introduction of an arbitrarily small messaging cost (i.e., when "! 0).11
11Note that there always exists a babbling equilibrium that survives "-perturbation of the model. In this
equilibrium, the investor does not send any message on the path. Cheap talk models with messaging costs have
been studied by Kartik (2009) and Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007). In these papers, however, the cost
of sending a message is not xed, but rather, increasing in its distance from the true state variable.
19
Proposition 2 (Inuential equilibrium with exogenous prices) Suppose the price upon
exit is given exogenously by p. An "-perturbation inuential equilibrium exists if and only if
  b (p)  E[h(e; p)je > max f; pg   

]: (13)
Moreover, in this equilibrium:
(i) The investor demands the board to change the status quo if and only if e > max f; pg  

,
and the board accommodates this demand.
(ii) The investor exits strategically if and only if  < p and e  p  

.
To understand Proposition 2, suppose rst that p  . In this case, the investor never
exits strategically since the value of her shares under the status quo is higher. The investor
demands a change if and only if e >   

. Since the board is biased toward the status quo and
the investor is biased against it, the board always keeps the status quo if the investor suggests
he should do so. By contrast, a change requires the board to forgo his private benets, and
therefore, convincing the board to do so is challenging. The equilibrium is inuential only if
the board responds positively to this demand. According to Lemma 3, the board chooses x = R
only if conditional on e >   

the expected value of h(e; p) is greater than . Therefore, the
board accommodates the investors demand for a change if and only if   E[h(e; p)je >   

].
Alternatively, suppose that p > . According to Lemma 2, the investor exits strategically
if e  p   

. In this case, the investor is indi¤erent with respect to the boards decision.
Since sending a message is costly, the investor remains silent. Not sending any message also
conveys information in equilibrium, and therefore, the investors silence is interpreted as an
implicit suggestion to keep the status quo. By contrast, if e > p  

then the investor has strict
incentives to keep her shares and demand a change, even if the communication of this demand
is costly. For the same reasons that were mentioned above, the challenge of the investor is to
convince the board to change the status quo when e > p   

. The board accommodates the
investors demand in this case if and only if   E[h(e; p)je > p  

]. The combination of these
two cases explains Proposition 2.
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The next result characterizes the price upon exit that arises under inuential equilibrium.
Lemma 5 (Endogenous prices under inuential equilibrium) Let p the price upon exit
in an "-perturbation inuential equilibrium. There exists  2 (0; ] such that if  2 [0; ] then
p =  where  >  is the unique solution of
p =  +
 Pr[e > p  

]
 Pr[e > p  

] + Pr[e  p  

]
E[e   je > p  

]: (14)
If  2 (; ) then either p >  and p is given by a solution of (14), or p <  and
p =  + Pr[e >    

]E[e   je >    

]: (15)
In equilibrium, the communication strategy and the price upon exit must be consistent with
each other. Suppose p > . According to Proposition 2, the investor exits strategically exactly
when she recommends the board to keep the status quo, i.e., when e  p   

. Therefore, if
the price upon exit is p and the investor decides to exit then the application of Bayesrules
on parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that the expected shareholder value is the right
hand side of (14). Notice that the right hand side of (14) depends on the quoted price p. In
equilibrium, the price upon exit must be fair, which explains why p >  must be a solution of
(14). In the Appendix, I show that if  2 [0; ] then (14) has a unique solution that is strictly
higher than . However, if  2 (; ) then the price upon exit in equilibrium can be lower
than . Intuitively, if  is large and the equilibrium is inuential then the investor is able to
convince the board to change the status quo even when it does not increase shareholder value.
The market maker expects the boards decision to be less e¢ cient and he quotes a low price. If
 is su¢ ciently large, the quoted price is low enough to discourage strategic exit (i.e., p < ).
In this case, exit must be driven by a liquidity shock, and therefore, the price upon exit must
be given by (15).
The next result follows immediately from the combination of Proposition 2 and Lemma 5.
Proposition 3 (Existence of inuential equilibria) Suppose  2 [0; ]. Then, an "-perturbation
inuential equilibrium exists if and only if   b ().
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Proposition 3 gives the conditions under which communication is e¤ective in equilibrium.
Notice that if an inuential equilibrium does not exist, communication must be ine¤ective, and
the only equilibrium is a babbling equilibrium as described by Proposition 1.
2.4 Comparative statics
Communication is more likely to be used as a governance mechanism when the equilibrium
is inuential. As standard in the cheap-talk literature, I select the inuential equilibrium
whenever it exists. Therefore, the e¤ectiveness of behind-the-scenes communications can be
measured by
b (p) = !E[e   je > max f; pg   

] (16)
+ (1  ) Pr[e > max f; pg    c

je > max f; pg   

] (p) :
The next result uses (16) to relate the e¤ectiveness of communication to the characteristics of
activist investors, corporate boards, and target rms.
Corollary 2 (Comparative statics) Suppose  2 [0; ]. An inuential equilibrium is more
likely to exist (i.e.,   b () holds) when , , and  are small, or ! and  are large. The
e¤ect of c, , and  is ambiguous.12
According to Corollary 2, if the board or the investor are relatively unbiased (small =!
and , respectively) then communication is more likely to be e¤ective in equilibrium. This is a
standard result in the cheap-talk literature. Intuitively, when the conict of interests between
the board and the investor is small, the investor can reveal more information and the board
has the incentives to use it for his decision making.
Corollary 2 also shows that if the threat of launching a successful public campaign is
credible (small ) and has severe consequences for the board (large ), then communication
is more e¤ective in equilibrium. This result highlights the complementarity between voice and
communication. Intuitively, if the investors threat to launch a campaign is credible and the
12In the proof of Corollary 2, I show that similar analysis holds when  2 (; ).
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consequences for the board are severe, the board would try to avoid a public campaign by
accommodating the investors demand for a change. At the same time, if the investor expects
the board to be responsive, she will have incentives to communicate rather than launching a
costly public campaign. Notice that e¤ective communication also increases the credibility of
the investors threat. To see why, suppose the price upon exit is p. When communication is
ine¤ective (i.e., a babbling equilibrium), the board is uninformed about e. The board believes
that if he keeps the status quo, the investor would launch a campaign with probability Pr[e >
max f; pg   c

]. However, if communication is e¤ective in equilibrium, the investors demand
for a change informs the board that e > max f; pg   

. Conditional on this event, the board
believes the investor would launch a campaign with probability Pr[e > max f; pg    c

je >
max f; pg  

] if her demand is ignored. Therefore, the board believes that the threat is more
credible when communication is e¤ective. Similar intuition holds when prices are endogenous.
The e¤ect of c on communication is ambiguous. On the one hand, Pr[e >   c

je >   

]
decreases with c, that is, the investor is less likely to launch a campaign when the cost is higher.
On the other hand, higher cost implies that the investors decision to launch a campaign is
a stronger signal of a large e. Indeed, the investor has no incentives to incur the cost of a
campaign if the benet from a change is not high enough to justify it. Therefore, the campaign
is more likely to be supported by shareholders ( () increases in c) and the investors threat is
more credible. This logic suggests that the investors ability to inuence the board can increase
with c.
The e¤ect of  depends on c and .13 E¤ectively, larger  reduces the investors bias toward
the status quo ( 

) but also the cost of launching a campaign ( c

). Therefore, if c >  (c < )
then the e¤ect of a larger  is similar to the e¤ect of a smaller c (lower ). In particular, if c > 
then a smaller stake can result in more e¤ective communications. Intuitively, the willingness
of a relatively unbiased investor to incur the cost of a campaign is a particularly strong signal
of a large e if she owns only few shares of the target to benet from this change. As a result,
13While  is exogenous in the model, it is clearly a choice variable of the investor in practice. As such, it is
likely to be correlated with other rm and investor characteristics (such as liquidity or the presence of other
blockholders), which could also a¤ect the investors ability to inuence the board. Note that  might also be
a¤ected by exogenous variables such disclosure requirements (13D) or defense measures (poison pills). See also
Section 3.3 for an extension in which the formation of the investors stake is endogenized.
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shareholders are more likely to support the campaign when  is small, and communication with
the board can be more e¤ective. By contrast, if c <  then the investor is relatively biased.
Shareholders have fewer reasons to trust the investor when  is small; they are legitimately
concerned that the motive behind the investors campaign is her private benets rather than
bringing a change that would increase their share value. In this case, larger  could increase
the credibility of the biased investor and result in more e¤ective communications.
The e¤ect of  on communication is also ambiguous. On the one hand, larger  increases the
probability the investor exits. Therefore, the threat of launching a campaign is less credible,
and the board is less likely to accommodate the investors demand. On the other hand, larger
 increases the price upon exit. Indeed, exit is more likely to stem from a liquidity shock rather
than over-valuation of the stock. As I explain below, a higher price upon exit can enhance the
investors inuence on the board. Through this channel, higher  can have a positive e¤ect on
communication. For example, if  = 0 then b () increases with .
2.4.1 The e¤ect of prices on communication
Understanding the e¤ect of p on the communication between the investor and the board is not
only useful for the comparative static of , but it can also relate the analysis to other exogenous
factors that a¤ect asset prices (e.g., taxes, disclosure requirements, market microstructure, and
liquidity).
Corollary 3 If  = 0,  (p) = 0, or f(x)
1 F (x) is non-increasing, then b
 (p) is an increasing
function of p.
Corollary 3 derives the conditions under which higher p enhances the investors ability to
inuence the board. This result can also be interpreted as a statement about the complemen-
tarity between exit and communication. There are two channels behind this result. Under the
rst channel, higher p relaxes the tension between the investor and the board. This can be seen
by noting that the term in the rst line of (16) is increasing in p. Intuitively, because of their
conict of interests, the board is suspicious of the investors motives. The board is concerned
that the investor exaggerates the benet from a change to the status quo in order to convince
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him to forgo his private benets. If the investor can exit at better terms (higher p) then she
has fewer incentives to insist on changing of the status quo, even if doing so would increase
shareholder value. Indeed, instead of insisting on a change and waiting for its realization, the
investor can remain silent, sell her stake, and receive the current market price. The board
understands that the investor would insist on a change only if the benet from doing so is
higher than what she expects to get from selling her shares, that is, p < e+ 

. While higher p
implies that the investor is less likely to demand a change, whenever she makes such demand,
it is a stronger signal about e. As a result, the board is more likely to accommodate a demand
for a change when p is higher.14
The second channel, which is captured by the second line of (16), shows that the credibility
of the investors threat to launch a successful campaign increases with p. There are two e¤ects.
First, note that if the hazard rate of e is non-increasing then Pr[e > max f; pg    c

je >
max f; pg   

] is an increasing function of p. That is, higher p implies that the investor is
more likely to launch a campaign if her demand for a change is ignored. Second, note that
 (p) is an increasing function of p. That is, higher p implies that shareholders are more likely
to support a campaign once it is initiated. Intuitively, if the investor launches a campaign
then shareholders infer that the investor is convinced that the benet from a change is higher
than the price she could get by selling her shares. Therefore, shareholders are more likely to
support the campaign. This e¤ect is stronger when the price upon exit is higher. Overall, this
analysis demonstrates a novel channel through which exit complements voice. Since the threat
of launching a successful campaign is more credible when p is higher, the board is more willing
to accommodate the investors demand and communication is more e¤ective.
Remark: If the hazard rate of e is increasing, then higher p implies that the investor is more
likely to exit if her demand for a change is ignored. This cut and rune¤ect is the standard
argument behind the substitution between voice and exit (e.g., Kahn and Winton (1998) and
Maug (1998)). When this e¤ect is in play, the overall e¤ect of p on b (p) is ambiguous: higher
14The idea that communication can be improved by weakening the senders incentives to maximize value is
also shared by Adams and Ferreira (2007), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2016), and Harris and Raviv (2008), who
show that a biased board (who is friendly to the manager) can play a more e¤ective advisory role.
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p increases  (p) and the term in the rst line of (16), but it also weakens the incentives of the
investor to launch a campaign if her demand is ignored. If =! is large, then the latter e¤ect
can dominate, in which case, exist and communication are substitutes.
Remark: The rst channel behind the result that exit enhances communications depends on
the assumption that by exiting, the investor sells her entire stake. In principle, selling all shares
might require several rounds of trade, from which the model abstracts. If the investor expects
to retain few shares even after exiting, she might try to maximize the value of these shares by
insisting on a change whenever e >    

(rather than e > p   

). In this case, exit will not
relax the tension between the investor and the board. Nevertheless, note that if the messaging
costs are not trivial (" > 0) and the number of shares the investor expects to retain after exit
is small, the rst channel is still likely to hold. Intuitively, the investor will have no incentives
to insist on a change and pay the xed messaging cost if she intends to sell most of her shares.
In any case, the second channel behind the result that exit enhances communications does not
depend on this assumption. Indeed, the investors decision to campaign increases her credibility
as long as the investor had the option to sell some of her shares.15
2.4.2 Shareholder value
If the equilibrium is inuential and the price upon exit is p then the expected shareholder
value is
W C   + Pr[e > max f; pg    ]E[e   je > max f; pg    ]: (17)
Notice that unlike the existence of an inuential equilibrium, the expected shareholder value
in this equilibrium does not depend on , !, , , and c. The next result shows that the bias
of the investor toward a change can benet shareholders.
Corollary 4 There is  > 0 such that W C increases in  if  < 
.
15Related, notice that short-selling is not a protable strategy in this model since it fully reveals that the
investor trades for information. In principle, if the investor could short the stock, she would have incentives
to recommend the board on actions that harm shareholder value. The investor will lose her credibility in
equilibrium. Generally, if the core business model of the investor is shareholder activism, sabotaging and then
short-selling will damage her reputation and harm her ability to constructively engage with rms in the future.
As such, it is not a sustainable strategy. The analysis of this repeated interaction is left for future research.
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Intuitively, when the equilibrium is inuential, the investor demands a change only if e is
su¢ ciently high. Since the investor can exit and get p for her shares, she is not always insisting
on a change when it is expected to increase shareholder value. Larger private benets mitigates
the investors excessive incentives to exit, and thereby, increase shareholder value. Notice that
a larger  has a similar e¤ect to a lower p. Therefore, the intuition behind Corollary 4 also
suggests that while a higher price upon exit increases the investors ability to inuence the
board, it does not necessarily increase shareholder value.
Remark: One might expect a constructive dialogue between the investor and the board to
benet other shareholders of the rm. But this intuition is not always correct. In the Online
Appendix, I give su¢ cient conditions under which the expected shareholder value when the
equilibrium is inuential is lower than it is under a babbling equilibrium. Intuitively, in order
to avoid the risk of a public campaign, the board is willing to accommodate the investors
demand for a change even if it does not always increase shareholder value. In those cases,
shareholder value would be higher if the investor did not communicate with the board.
Remark: The analysis suggests that a successful and protable public campaign (for example,
Elliotts campaign against BMC) does not necessarily imply that the employed tactic is more
e¤ective or protable than others; it only suggests that when this tactic is optimally employed,
the stakes are likely to be high. Indeed, in the model, the e¤ect of a change on rm value
is the same whether it is achieved by communications or by launching a public campaign.
Nevertheless, in equilibrium, the expected shareholder value conditional on a public campaign
is always higher than it is conditional on e¤ective communications. In the former case it is
E[eje  maxf; pg   

+ c

], and in the latter case it is E[eje  maxf; pg   

]. Intuitively,
activist investors launch a campaign only if the prot from a change outweighs the cost of
campaigning. By contrast, activists communicate and demand a change even if they have no
intention to launch a campaign. Since the board cannot tell whether the activist is blu¢ ng or
not, e¤ective communications create value even if the benet from a change is not high enough
to justify the cost of campaigning, i.e., when maxf; pg   

< e  maxf; pg   

+ c

.
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3 Extensions
This section consider three extensions of the baseline model. All proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
3.1 Public communications
In practice, dialogues between investors and rms are typically held behind closed doors. In
the baseline model, the message from the investor is private since by assumption only the board
observes it. The possibility of launching a public campaign captures instances in which activists
escalate their e¤orts, and among other things, put their demands on the public domain. In
this subsection, I consider an extension of the model in which the initial message from the
investor is also observed by the market maker and other shareholders of the rm. That is, the
message is public.16 Di¤erent from launching a public campaign, sending a public message is
not costly (" ! 0), it cannot force a change if the board resists it, and the investor can still
exit or campaign afterwards.
In principle, public communications could a¤ect the stock price the investor receives when
selling her shares or inuence the decision of shareholders to support her campaign. The next
result shows that public communications are likely to be ine¤ective.
Proposition 4 (Public communications)
(i) If the investor can only send public messages then an inuential equilibrium does not
exist.17
(ii) If the investors can send both public and private messages, then the set of equilibria
is identical to the set of equilibria that emerges with only private messages. In these
equilibria, public messages are uninformative and ignored by all market participants.
16Farrell and Gibbons (1989) also consider a cheap talk model with multiple audiences and compare public
and private communication, although the context is di¤erent.
17The proof shows that an inuential equilibrium with only public messages may exist only if  = 0 and
 = E[eje >     c ]. These are very restrictive conditions. If an inuential equilibrium exists under these
conditions, then the price upon exit must be  regardless of the investors message. The boards decision
depends on the investors message in equilibrium only if in addition we require c = 0.
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To understand the intuition behind Proposition 4, note that public communications target
two audiences: the market maker and other shareholders of the rm. When the message is
public, the investor is tempted to manipulate the stock price. Regardless of the true value ofe, the investor will send the public message that results in the highest stock price upon exit.
The market maker, who has rational expectations, foresees this opportunistic behavior and
ignores the content of these public messages. In equilibrium, public messages cannot a¤ect the
stock price, a feature which constrains the amount of information they can embed. Similarly,
the board and other shareholders understand the investors incentives to manipulate prices.
They also understand her incentives to convince shareholders to support her campaign to gain
leverage over the board. For both of these reasons, they will not nd the public messages
from the investor credible. In equilibrium, they ignore them. This logic explains the intuition
behind part (i).
Part (ii) considers an extended game in which the investor can simultaneously send public
and private messages. As part (i) suggests, public messages have no credibility. Nevertheless,
the possibility of sending public messages does not prevent the investor from communicating
with the board behind closed doors, and still exert inuence. In this case, the set of equilibria
that emerges when both private and public messages are allowed, coincides with the analysis in
Section 2.3. This result potentially explains why communications between investors and rms
are typically held behind closed doors. Indeed, if sending a public message is costly, even if
the cost is arbitrarily small as I assume in the baseline model, then part (ii) suggests that the
investor will avoid sending public messages in equilibrium.
Remark: Note that the di¤erence between the e¤ectiveness of private and public messages is
solely driven by the possibility of exit and price manipulation. In the Online Appendix, I show
that without the possibility of exit, the set of equilibria with public messages is identical to
the set of equilibria with private messages. This result suggests that public communications
are credible only if the market does not expect the investor to exit prematurely.
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3.2 Informed board and alternative sources of private information
A key assumption of the model is that the investor has private information that complements
the knowledge of the board. If the board is already informed about e, there is no information
about rm value that the board could learn from the investor. Nevertheless, the board may still
wish to learn about the possibility that the investor would launch a successful campaign if her
demand is ignored. If  > 0, this information may change the calculation behind the boards
decision to accommodate the investors demand.18 To explore this possibility, I assume that the
board is perfectly informed about e (the market maker and shareholders remain uninformed)
while the investor has an alternative source of private information, as described below.
3.2.1 Private information on the feasibility of a public campaign
Activist investors could have private information about c, the cost of campaigning (e.g., the
investors governance expertise), about, the likelihood that other shareholders would support
their campaign (e.g., the discontent of other shareholders, the ownership structure of the
rm, the stand of proxy advisory rms on the issue, etc.), or about , the consequences of
a successful public campaign to the board. In all of these cases, the investors preferences
are common knowledge, and the investor has incentives to pretend that if the board does
not accommodate her demand to change the status quo, a successful campaign is more likely
than it really is, and that the consequences are more severe than it seems. In equilibrium,
the investor has no credibility, and therefore, the board always ignores her messages. In this
respect, communications between investors and rms cannot be meaningful when c, , or 
are the only source of the investors private information.
Proposition 5 (Communicating the feasibility of a public campaign) Suppose the board
and the investor are perfectly informed about e. If the investors only source of private infor-
mation is c, , or , then an inuential equilibrium does not exist.
18Related, Brandenburger and Polak (1996) show that managers with short-term concerns will distort their
decisions toward what the market believes is the best even if they know the market is wrong.
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3.2.2 Private information about the investors preferences
Activist investors could also have private information about their private benets from certain
strategies () or about their beliefs on which direction the company should be taking. Speci-
cally, in the second case, the investor and the board agree to disagree: while the board believes
that the benet from a change is e, the investor believes it is e, where e is independent of e
and it is the investors private information. Unlike Section 3.2.1, here the investor has private
information about her preferences with respect to the status quo. In the Online Appendix
I show that if  > 0 then an inuential equilibrium can exist in these two setups, that is,
communication can be meaningful. Intuitively, as in the baseline model, the investor demands
a change if and only if the benet from doing so is su¢ ciently high. While the board does not
learn from the investors demand about the benet to rm value, he learns about the likelihood
she will launch a campaign if her demand is ignored. The investor has incentives to reveal her
preferences not only because she tries to convince the board to meet her demand to change
the status quo, but also because she tries to ensure that board does not mistakenly change the
status quo where in fact the investor prefers him to keep it.
3.3 Block formation
The appearance of an activist as a shareholder is likely to signal her private information. In
this subsection, I demonstrate that this signaling does not necessarily substitute for e¤ective
communications with the board. For this purpose, consider an extension of the model with
N  2 ex-ante identical rms. Exactly one of these rms is the target. Each rm has an equal
chance of being a target. The value of the target is v(e; x), while the value of a nontarget rm
is  irrespective of e. The investor has private information about e and about which rm is the
target. Everyone else is uninformed. Conditional on this information, the investor submits an
order to buy   0 shares from a risk-neutral and competitive market maker. The investor is
constrained to invest in one rm only. The share price is set equal to the expected rm value
conditional on the order ows. For simplicity, I assume that the market maker can condition
the price on  if and only if  > , where  > 0. Parameter  captures in a reduced form the
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investors ability to hide her trades and build a position without creating a signicant price
impact. Finally, the investors position becomes public prior to any interaction with the board
(e.g., 13D lings). This assumption tilts the model against obtaining the result that e¤ective
communications can exist in equilibrium when the formation of the block is endogenized. Given
the revelation of , the game unfolds as in the baseline model.
Proposition 6 (Block formation) Suppose  2 [0; ], N > W C 
  , and   b ().19 Then,
there exists an equilibrium in which the activist buys  shares of the target with probability one,
and post entry the equilibrium unfolds as described by Propositions 2 and Lemma 5.20
To understand Proposition 6, note that the investor trades on two pieces of private infor-
mation: the value of e and the identity of the target rm. The information about e is not
necessarily revealed when her position is disclosed, which leaves room for communications with
the board. Specically, if the investor buys  shares of the target and post entry she can inu-
ence the board (i.e.,   b ()), then the expected value of the target is W C , which is given
by (17). Ex-ante, the market maker does not know which rm is the target, and therefore,
it quotes a price of pentry =
1
N
W C +
N 1
N
 whenever   . The conditions N > W C 
  and
 2 [0; ] guarantee that  > pentry. Therefore, regardless of the realization of e, the investor
can secure an abnormal prot by buying  shares of the target, communicating with its board,
and then selling whenever e     

. This strategy is protable since the investor can buy
enough shares without fully revealing the identity of the target rm. Once the investors po-
sition is revealed, the share price increases by W C   pentry > 0, to reect the identication
of the rm as the target. The share price also captures the value the investor is expected to
create by communicating with the board. Since the investor can exit her position and still
make a prot ( > pentry), a pooling equilibrium with respect to e exists. Therefore, in this
equilibrium, the disclosure of the investors position does not reveal e, which leaves room for
strategic communications with the board.
19Note that , , b (), and W C are evaluated at  = . Also, W

C is evaluated at p
 = .
20The pooling equilibrium is supported with o¤-equilibrium beliefs that if  6=  then the rm is a nontarget.
Notice that other equilibria could exist.
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Remark: A similar argument can be made if instead the investor has private information
about the type of change (e.g., restructuring the balance sheet or selling under-performing
assets) and the benet that each change might bring about. The formation of a block might
reveal which type of change the investor is pushing for, but will leave room for the investor to
convince the board that the proposed change is indeed in the best interest of the rm.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the conditions under which communications between investors and rms
is an e¤ective form of shareholder activism. The main premise of this paper is that activist
investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the companys board of
directors or the majority of shareholders that adopting their proposals is in the best interests
of the rm.
In this framework, I show that voice and exit enhance the ability of activists to e¤ectively
communicate with rms and inuence corporate policy. Voice enhances communications since
the most e¤ective way corporate boards can avoid the consequences of a public campaign is by
accommodating the activists demand, which in turn, increases the incentives of the activist
to engage and communicate with the board. Exit also enhances communications, through two
di¤erent and novel channels: (i) it relaxes the tension and the conict of interests between
investors and rms, and (ii) it allows investors to signal more credibly their beliefs about the
benet from changing the status quo of the rm. The analysis also demonstrates that public
communications are likely to be ine¤ective. Essentially, activists cannot resist the temptation
to use their public message to boost the stock price, which in turn, harms their credibility
and ability to e¤ectively inuence corporate policy. This rationale justies the prevalence of
behind-the-scenes communications.
As a whole, this paper o¤ers a new perspective on shareholder activism and novel predic-
tions on the relationship between the frequency of behind-the-scenes communications and the
characteristics of activist investors, corporate boards, and target rms.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose x = L. By assumption, e = 1 ) s = 1 and s = 1 ) e = 0.
Therefore, e = 0 is necessary for e = 1. Suppose E[e   je = 1]   in equilibrium. That
is, shareholders support a campaign to change the status quo. The investors expected payo¤
conditional on e is
uI = 
8>>><>>>:
p if s = 1 and e = 0
 if s = 0 and e = 0e +  c

if s = 0 and e = 1:
(18)
Therefore, e = 1 if and only if e+  c

> max f; pg, which is equivalent to (7) holds. Moreover,
this argument implies that
E[eje = 1] = E[eje > max f; pg    c

] (19)
and (8) must hold. Therefore, both (7) and (8) are necessary for an equilibrium in which e = 1
is on the path. Given the arguments above, it is straight forward to prove that both conditions
are also su¢ cient.
Note that there may also exist equilibria in which e = 1 is o¤ the path. Indeed, if e = 1 is
o¤ the path and the o¤-equilibrium beliefs satisfy E[e   je = 1] < , the investor will never
deviate to e = 1. However, Lemma 6 in the Online Appendix proves that an equilibrium in
which e = 1 is o¤ the path survives the Grossman and Perry (1986) renement if and only if
(8) does not holds.21
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose e = 0. If x = R then the investors expected payo¤conditional
on e is
uI = 
8<:p if s = 1e + = if s = 0; (20)
and part (i) follows immediately. Suppose x = L. If either (7) or (8) do not hold then,
according to Lemma 1, it must be e = 0 in equilibrium. In this case, the investors expected
payo¤ conditional on e is
uI = 
8<:p if s = 1 if s = 0 ; (21)
21Note that if e = 1 is on the equilibrium path then the equilibrium vacuously satises the Grossman and
Perry (1986) renement.
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and she exists strategically if and only if   p. If both (7) and (8) hold then, according to
Lemma 1, it must be s = 0 and e = 1 in equilibrium. This completes part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let p be the price upon exit. According to Lemma 3, the board
chooses x = R if and only if   E[h(e; p)jm]. Since the message is uninformative, x = L
(x = R) requires   E[h(e; p)] (  E[h(e; p)]). Suppose rst that x = L in equilibrium.
Notice that s = 1) e = 0. Therefore, the price upon exit must be p = , and an equilibrium
with x = L exists if and only if   E[h(e; )]. This completes the proof of part (ii). Next,
suppose that x = R in equilibrium. According to Lemma 2 part (i), the price upon exit must
be a solution of p = ' (p  =) where
' (y)  E[
e] + (1  ) Pr[e < y]E[eje < y]
 + (1  ) Pr[e < y] : (22)
Note that ' (p  =) is the right hand side of (12). Below, I prove that N is the unique
solution of p = ' (p  =). Therefore, given N , an equilibrium with x = R exists if and only
if   E[h(e; N)].
To complete the proof of part (i), I show that p = ' (p  =) has a unique solution.
Existence follows from limp!1 ' (p  =) = E[e]. For uniqueness, I proceed in two steps:
1. Similar to Proposition 1 in Acharya et al. (2011), a unique solution for p = ' (p)
always exists and it is given by the global minimum of ' (p). For completeness, I repeat
their argument here. Consider a solution of p0 = ' (p0), and note that p0 is the weighted
average of cases where the investor is forced to exit, and cases where she exits strategically,
that is,   p0. Suppose p0 < p0. Relative to ' (p0), ' (p0) adds cases where p0 <   p0.
Since p0 = ' (p0) and ' (p0) is the average rm value, by adding cases where rm value is
above the average, the average value must increase. Therefore, ' (p0) < ' (p0). Similarly,
suppose p0 < p0. Relative to ' (p0), ' (p0) removes cases where p0   < p0. Since
p0 = ' (p0) and ' (p0) is the average rm value, by removing cases where rm value is
below the average, the average value must increase. Therefore, ' (p0) < ' (p0). It follows,
p0 must be the global minimum of ' (p), and hence, it is unique. Let the global minimum
be pmin.
2. Given point #1, p  = = ' (p  =) also has a unique solution given by pmin + =,
which is the global minimum of ' (p  =). Therefore, the line p must intersect the
function ' (p  =) when it is decreasing. Let this intersection point be N , and note
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that N < pmin + =. Note that ' (p  =) is a decreasing function of p when p <
pmin + =, and therefore, p < N ) p < ' (p  =) and p 2 (N ; pmin + =) ) p >
' (p  =). If p  pmin+= then p =  ' (p  =) (since pmin+= is the unique
solution of p   = = ' (p  =)), and therefore, p > pmin + = ) p > ' (p  =).
Combined, his implies that N is the unique solution of p = ' (p  =), as required.
This concludes the argument.
Finally, based on parts (i) and (ii), a babbling equilibrium in pure strategies always exists
unless E[h(e; N)] <  < E[h(e; )]. In Lemma 7 in the Online Appendix, I show that in this
case a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists.
Proof of Lemma 4. According to Denition 1, if the equilibrium is inuential then there
are two messages on the equilibrium path, mR 6= mL, such that if m = mR (m = mL) then
x = R (x = L). Suppose on the contrary the investor launches a campaign on the equilibrium
path. Let 0 be a realization that triggers this event on the path. Therefore, if e = 0 then the
investor chooses in equilibrium m = mL, s = 0 (unless e = 1) and e = 1. Let " (m) > 0 be the
cost of sending message m. The investors expected payo¤ from this strategy is
p + (1  ) (0 +    c)  " (mL) :
If instead the investor chooses m = mR, s = 0 (unless e = 1) and e = 0, then her expected
payo¤ from this deviation is
p + (1  ) (0 + )  " (mR) :
Comparing the two terms, the deviation is strictly preferred if and only if c > "(mR) "(mL)
1  . Note
that c > 0 and the right hand side converges to zero as " ! 0. Therefore, for " su¢ ciently
small, we get a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the price upon exit is p. Suppose an inuential equilibrium
exists. For x 2 fL;Rg dene
Mx  fm is on the path s.t. x (m) = xg : (23)
Since the equilibrium is inuential, ML and MR are not empty. Fix " > 0 (which is arbitrarily
small) and let "^  "
(1 ) . As was argued in the main text, without the loss of generality, there
always exists a message on the equilibrium path that the investor can send without any cost.
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I denote this message by . Therefore,  2ML [MR. I claim the following:
1. ML = fg. Proof: Suppose on the contrary that there is m00 6=  such that m00 2 ML
and  2 ML. Since x (m00) = x (), but sending m00 is costly whereas sending  is not,
m00 must be o¤-equilibrium, a contradiction. Therefore, if  2 ML then ML = fg. I
prove that  2 ML. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose p  . Suppose on
the contrary x () = R. Since the equilibrium is inuential, there is exists m0 6=  such
that m0 2ML. Conditional on e, the investor prefers sending message  over message m0
if and only if
p+ (1  ) maxfe + ; pg  p+ (1  ) maxf; pg   ",
maxfe + =; pg     "^:
(based on Lemma 4, we can ignore the possibility of launching a campaign). Since p  ,
the investor strictly prefers sending message , which means that message m0 must be
o¤-equilibrium, a contradiction. We conclude that if p   then ML = fg. Second,
suppose p < . Notice that the investor never exits strategically. To see why, note that
since "^ > 0 can be arbitrarily small, I can assume without the loss of generality that
p <   "^. Since the equilibrium is inuential, the investor can a¤ect the boards decision
by sending the appropriate message. Therefore, the investor can always send message
m 2 ML, choose s = 0, and obtain an expected value of at least p + (1  )    ",
which is larger than p if and only if p <    "^. Therefore, the investor never exits
strategically. For this reason, the investor is never indi¤erent between action L and R
(unless e + = =    "^, which is a zero probability event). Therefore, without the loss
of generality,  2ML.
2. The investor sends message  if e  maxf; pg   

+ "^ and message m 2MR otherwise.
Proof: Based on Claim 1, x () = L. Conditional on e, the investor prefers sending
message  over message m 2MR if and only if
p+ (1  ) max f; pg  p+ (1  ) maxfe + ; pg   ",
max f; pg  maxfe + 

; pg   "^,
max f; pg   

+ "^  e:
Note that Lemma 4 was invoked.
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3. I argue, if an inuential equilibrium exists then
  E[h(e; pg)je > maxf; pg   

+ "^]: (24)
Proof: Based on claims 1 and 2, m 2MR , e > maxf; pg   + "^. According to Lemma
3,   E[h(e; p)jm] must hold for all m 2MR. The result follows by integrating over all
m 2MR.22
4. The investor exits strategically if and only if p   and e  p   

+ "^. Proof: Supposee = 0. In the proof of Claim 1 I already proved that if p <  then the investor never
exits strategically. Suppose p  . Based on Claim 2, if e  p  

+ "^ then the investor
sends message m = . Based on Claim 1, x () = L and the investors payo¤ if s = 0 is
. Since p  , the investor exits strategically. Based on Claim 2, if e > p  

+ "^ then
the investor sends message m 2 MR. Based on Claim 1, x (m) = R and the investors
payo¤ if s = 0 is e + . The investor exits strategically if and only if p  e + =.
However, note that e > p  

+ "^) e + 

> p, and therefore, the investor does not exit
unless e = 1.
5. Overall, invoking " ! 0 on Claim 3 yields (13); invoking " ! 0 on Claim 2 yields part
(i); invoking "! 0 on Claim 4 yields part (ii).
Next, x " > 0 and suppose (24) holds. I prove that an inuential equilibrium exists.
Consider the following strategies
(e) =
8<:mR if e > maxf; pg    + "^mL 6= mR if e  maxf; pg    + "^ , x(m) =
8<:R if m = mRL if m = mL;
and the investor exits strategically if and only if p   and e  p  

+ "^. I verify that these
strategies are incentive compatible. According to Lemma 3, the strategy x(m) maximizes the
boards expected utility if and only if
E[h(e; p)je  maxf; pg   

+ "^]    E[h(e; p)je > maxf; pg   

+ "^]: (25)
Notice that e  maxf; pg   

+ "^ implies e < max f; pg    c

for " su¢ ciently small.
22Note that the cost of sending a message " is already sunk when the investor decides whether to launch a
campaign.
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Therefore,
E[h(e; p)je  maxf; pg   

+ "^] = !E[e   je  maxf; pg   

+ "^]: (26)
Since !E[e   ]  , then the left hand side of (25) must hold. Moreover, since condition
(24) holds, the right hand side of condition (25) also holds. Therefore, the boards strategy is
incentives compatible. Consider the investors decisions. By repeating the arguments in claims
2 and 4, one can prove that given p and the boards strategy, it is optimal for the investor to
follow the prescribed communication and exit strategies. Therefore, an inuential equilibrium
exists, as required. Invoking "! 0 completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix " > 0 and let "^  "
(1 ) . Suppose the equilibrium is inuential and
let the price upon exit in this equilibrium be p. According to the proof of Proposition 2, the
investor sends message  if e  maxf; pg  

+ "^ and message m 2MR otherwise. Moreover,
the investor exits strategically if and only if p   and e  p   

+ "^. Therefore, p must
satisfy 8<:p = p   + Pr[e >     + "^]E[e   je >     + "^] if p < p =   p   

+ "^

if p  
(27)
where
 (y)   Pr[
e > y]E[eje > y] + Pr[e  y]
 + (1  ) Pr[e  y] =  + 
R
y
(   ) f () d
 + (1  )F (y)
I show three claims:
1. There is r0 > 0 such that if 

  "^  r0 then p > . Proof: note that if  = 0 and
" is su¢ ciently small then p > . Suppose  > 0 and " is su¢ ciently small such that


  "^ > 0. Note that @p
@[ 

 "^] < 0,    "^ > 0. Therefore, there is r0 > 0 as required.
2. If 

  "^  r0 then there exists a solution of p =   p   

+ "^

that is strictly greater
than . Proof: based on Claim 1, if 

  "^ < r0 then p >  and therefore, E[eje >
  

+ "^] > . Notice that E[eje >   

+ "^] >  implies 
 
   

+ "^

> . Also notice
that limp!1 
 
p  

+ "^

= . From the continuity of  (), there exists p >  such that
p = 
 
p   

+ "^

.
3. There is r00 > 0 such that if 

  "^  r00 then @(p 


+"^)
@p
< 0 for all p > . Proof: Notice
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that
@(p  +"^)
@p
= @(y)
@y
jy=p  

+"^. Also note that
@(y)
@y
< 0,Z
y
(   ) f () d + (y   ) [ 
1   + F (y)] > 0:
Also notice that there is y^ 2 (0; ) such that if y  y^ then the left hand side is strictly
positive. Let r00     y^ > 0. If 

  "^ < r00 and p >  then p  

+ "^ > y^, and therefore,
@(y)
@y
jy=p  

+"^ < 0 for all p > , as required.
Suppose 

  "^  min fr0; r00g. Claim 1 implies that p > , claim 2 implies that p =

 
p   

+ "^

has a solution that is strictly greater than , and Claim 3 implies that this
solution must be unique. Therefore, (27) implies that the price upon exit in equilibrium must
be the unique solution of p = 
 
p   

+ "^

. Suppose 

  "^ > min fr0; r00g. If 

  "^ < r0
then, according to Claim 2, p = 
 
p   

+ "^

has a solution, and it can arise in equilibrium.
If r0 < 

  "^ then, according to Claim 1, p = p can arise in equilibrium. Invoking "! 0, and
letting   min fr0; r00g completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. First note that , which is given by the solution of (14), is invariant to
(; !;; c; ). The e¤ect of  and  on b () is straight forward. Since  () is decreasing in
, so must b (). Notice that if  2 [0; ] then  > , and therefore, E[e je >   

] > 0.
This implies that b () increases in !. The e¤ect of c is ambiguous since  () increases with
c but Pr[e >     c

je >    

] decreases with c. The e¤ect of  is ambiguous for similar
reasons. To see the e¤ect of  and , below I argue that    

decreases in  and increases
in . If true, then noting that b () increases in    

implies that b () decreases in .23
Since  also has a direct e¤ect (the term 1    in the second line of (16)), its overall e¤ect is
ambiguous.
To see why    

decreases in 

and increases in , let 
 
p  


be the right hand side
of (14). I make three observations: (i) in the proof of Lemma 5, I show that if  2 [0; ] then
 is unique and  () is decreasing in p in the neighborhood of p = ; (ii) According to (14),
 >  ) E[e   je >    

] > 0; (iii)
@(p  )
@
> 0 , E[e   je > p   

] > 0. Using these
three observation and the application of the implicit function theorem on p     p  


= 0,
we get
@[   ]
@
=  
@(p   )
@
jp=
@(p   )
@p
jp=
> 0
23Notice that if f has a non-increasing hazard rate than Pr[e >  + c je > ] increases in .
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and
@[   ]
@( 

)
=  
@(p   )
@(

 )
jp=
1  @(p 

 )
@p
jp=
  1 =
@(p   )
@p
jp=
1  @(p 

 )
@p
jp=
  1 < 0:
Remark: If  2 (; ) and in equilibrium p  , then b () and b () have a similar
comparative static. Indeed, the only di¤erence is that  is replaced by . Notice that 
depends on 

and . Therefore, one di¤erence is that b () decreases with . However,
since both    

and    

decrease with 

, b () and b () have the same (qualitatively)
comparative statics with respect to 

.
Remark: If  2 (; ) and in equilibrium p >  , but (14) has more than one solution,
then focusing on equilibria in which (p   

) crosses the 45 degrees line from above (i.e.,
@(p  

)
@p
jp=p < 1) generates the same comparative static for b (p). Notice that focusing on
equilibria with these properties is reasonable since they are locally stable.
Proof of Corollary 3. If  (p) = 0 then b (p) = E[e   je > maxf; pg   

] which is
increasing in p. If  (p) > 0 then assuming that f()
1 F () is non-increasing guarantees that
Pr[e > y    c

je > y   

] is an increasing function of y, and therefore, b (p) increases in p.
Proof of Corollary 4. Notice that W C increases in 
   

if and only if    

< . In the
proof of Corollary 2, I show that    

decreases in . Since  >  for all  2 [0; ], there is
 > 0 such that W C increases in  if and only if  < 
.
Proof of Proposition 4. When the messages from the investor are public the denition of
an inuential equilibrium is extended as follows. Let p (m) be the price upon exit as a function
of message m and let  (m) be the decision of shareholders to support a campaign conditional
on e = 1 and message m. Then, an equilibrium with public messages is inuential if there exist
0 6= 00 in the support of f such that (0) 6=  (00) and at least one of the following holds:
(a) x ((0)) 6= x ((00)); (b) p ((0)) 6= p ((00)); (c)  ((0)) 6=  ((00)).
Consider part (i). I proceed in four steps:
1. First, suppose that x (m0) = x (m00) and  (m0) =  (m00) for every messagesm0 andm00
on the equilibrium path. Since  > 0, the investor sometimes must exit, and therefore, she
has strict incentives to send the message that maximizes the price upon exit. Therefore,
it must be p (m0) = p (m00) for every messages m0 and m00 on the equilibrium path,
which means that equilibrium is not inuential.
2. Second, suppose x (m0) = x (m00) for every messagesm0 andm00 on the equilibrium path,
but on the contrary, there are m1 6= m0 on the equilibrium path such that  (m0) = 0
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and  (m1) = 1. Since x (m) is invariant to all messages, 
 (m1) = 1 implies that it
must be x = L. In this equilibrium, p (m0) = . Notice that among all messages that
result in  (m) = 1, the investor will choose the one that maximizes p (m). Without
the loss of generality, suppose there is only one message such that  (m1) = 1, and let
p1  p (m1). If the investor sends message m0 she gets  per share whether or not she
exits. If the investor sends m1 then her payo¤ is p1 + (1  ) maxfp1; ;e +  c g. If
p1 >  then the investor never sends m0, which yields a contradiction. Suppose p

1  .
Then, the investor prefers sendingm1 over messagem0 if and only if she intends to choose
e = 1 and
p1 + (1  ) (e +  c ) >  , e >  p11     c : (28)
Note that p1   implies that if the investor sends m1 then she never exits strategically
(otherwise, she could choose m0 and get  instead of p1  ). Therefore, the price upon
exit p1   must solve
p1 = E[eje >  p11     c ]: (29)
Since e = 1 does not provide additional information relative to m = m1, 
 (m1) = 1
requires shareholders to support the campaign, that is,
E[eje >  p1
1     c ]    : (30)
Since we require p1  , this equilibrium can exist only if both (29) and (30) hold, which
require p1 =  ,  = 0, and  = E[eje >     c ]. These are knife edge conditions, and
unless they hold, we get a contradiction.
3. Third, suppose there are mL 6= mR on the equilibrium path such that x (mL) = L and
x (mR) = R. In this equilibrium, p (mL) = . Notice that among all messages that
result in x = R, the investor will choose the one that maximizes p (m). Without the
loss of generality, suppose there is only one message such that x (mR) = R, and let
pR  p (mR). If the investor sends message mL then she gets  per share whether or not
she exits. If the investor sends message mR then she gets pR+(1  ) maxfpR;e+ g. If
pR >  then the investor never sends message mL, which yields a contradiction. Suppose
pR  . Then, the investor prefers sending message mR over message mL if and only if
pR + (1  ) (e + ) >  , e >  pR1     : (31)
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Note that pR   implies that if the investor sends mR then she never exits strategically.
Therefore, the price upon exit pR   must solve
pR = E[eje >  pR1     ]: (32)
Suppose  (mR) = 0. The board chooses x = R following message mR if and only if
 + !  !E[eje >  pR
1     ], =! +   pR: (33)
But notice that pR   and =! > 0 imply that this condition is never met, which
contradicts x (mR) = R. Suppose 
 (mR) = 1. Notice that if m = mR and x = L,
the investor does exit strategically and she has strict incentives to launch a campaign if
and only if e >     c

. Therefore, if e = 1 then e  maxf    c

;
 pR
1    g, and
 (mR) = 1implies
E[eje  maxf    c

;
 pR
1    g]    : (34)
Suppose     c

  pR
1     . Since pR  , this equilibrium can exist only if both (32)
and (34) hold, which require pR =  ,  = 0, c = 0, and  = E[eje >     ]. These
are knife edge conditions, and unless they hold, we get a contradiction. Instead, suppose
that     c

>
 pR
1     . This condition requires pR >    c 1  . However, combined
with (32), it must be
   c

1 

> E[eje >  (  c 1  )
1     ],    c 1  > E[eje >     c ]:
However, since (34) must also holds, it must be pR =  ,  = 0, c = 0, and  = E[eje >
   

]. Once again, these are knife edge conditions, and unless they hold, we get a
contradiction.
4. Overall, an inuential equilibrium with public messages exist only if  = 0 and  =
E[eje >     c

]. If it exists, the price upon exit must be  regardless of the message
sent by the investor. If c > 0, then in this equilibrium the board must be non-responsive
to the message (but the shareholders are responsive). If c = 0 then there may exist an
equilibrium in which the board is also responsive. This completes part (i).
Consider part (ii), and suppose the investor can send both public and private messages.
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To ease the notation, private messages and are denoted by m and while public messages
are denoted by n. The board observes both types of messages while the market maker and
other shareholders only observe the public messages. The communication strategy is now a
mapping  :

0; 
 ! 0; 2. Note that  () =  private () ; public (). An equilibrium is
inuential if there exist 0 6= 00 in the support of f such that (0) 6=  (00) and at least
one of the following holds: (a) x ((0)) 6= x ((00)); (b) p(public(0)) 6= p(public(00)); (c)
(public(
0)) 6= (public(00)).
I argue that there is no inuential equilibrium in which part (b) or part (c) of the denition
hold. If x (m0; n0) = x (m00; n00) for every messages (m0; n0) and (m00; n00) on the equilibrium
path, then the result follows immediately from the rst part of the proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose there are (mL; nL) 6= (mR; nR) on the equilibrium path such that x (mL; nL) = L
and x (mR; nR) = R. Since  > 0, there is always a positive probability that the investor
will exit, and therefore, among all messages (mR; nR) such that x (mR; nR) = R, she only
sends those that generate the highest price upon exit. Similarly, among all messages (mL; nL)
such that x (mL; nL) = L, she only sends those that generate the highest price upon exit.
Also notice that the investor does not pay attention to the e¤ect of these pubic messages on
shareholdersdecision to support the campaign, the investor can always inuence the boards
decision by sending the appropriate message. Therefore, without the loss of generality, (mL; nL)
and (mR; nR) with the properties above are unique. I argue that it must be nL = nR. Suppose
on the contrary that nL 6= nR. In this case, the messages (mL; nL) and (mR; nR) are e¤ectively
public. That is, the market maker and shareholders infer that if n = nR (n = nL) then it must
be m = mR (m = mL). Therefore, the same proof as of part (i) of Proposition 4 shows that
an inuential equilibrium cannot exist. That is, it cannot be x (mL; nL) 6= x (mR; nR), which
yields a contradiction. Therefore, it must be nL = nR. However, if nL = nR then the messages
(mL; nL) and (mR; nR) are e¤ectively private. In this case, an inuential equilibrium will exist
under the same conditions of Proposition 2, and will have the same properties. The public
messages must be uninformative. Overall, every inuential equilibrium must satisfy Denition
1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the board and the investor are both perfectly informed
about e. Let ez 2 fec; e; eg be a random variable with probability density function fz. Suppose
the investor privately observes ez. In this setup, an equilibrium is considered inuential if there
exist z0 6= z00 in the support of fz and  

0; 

with Pr[e 2 ] > 0 such that (z0) 6=  (z00)
and x ((z0); ) 6= x ((z00); ) for every  2 .
Suppose an inuential equilibrium exists, and let p be the price upon exit in this equi-
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librium. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose p  . As in the baseline model,
the investor exits strategically if and only if e > p   

. If e  p   

then the investor will
exit either way, and therefore, she will remain silent, i.e., send message  regardless of the
realization of ez. Suppose e > p   

. The investor has strict incentives to convince the board
to choose x = R. Therefore, the investor will only send messages that result with x = R.
Either way, the equilibrium is not inuential.
Second, suppose p < . As in the baseline model, the investor has no incentives to exit
strategically, and she would like the board to change the status quo if and only if e >    

.
Therefore, if e <   

(e >   

) then, regardless of the realization of ez, the investor has strict
incentives to convince the board to choose x = L (x = R), and she will only send messages
that result with x = L (x = R). Either way, the equilibrium is not inuential.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let  () be as dened by Lemma 5, let b ( () ; ) be
as given by (16), and let W C () be as given by (17). Consider an equilibrium in which
the investor buys  shares of the target regardless of the realization of e. In this pooling
equilibrium, the disclosure of the investors position does not reveal information about e.
Since   b ( () ; ), post-entry the equilibrium unfolds as described by Proposition 2 and
Lemma 5, where  is replaced by  everywhere. Moreover, in this equilibrium, if    then
pentry () =
1
N
W C () +
N 1
N
. Indeed, the market maker believes that there is probability
1
N
that the rm is targeted by the investor. If the investor targets this rm, then based on
Proposition 2, the expected shareholder value is W C (). However, if the rm is not the
target, then the investor will not buy shares of the rm, the board of this non-target rm will
maintain the status quo, and the value of this rm is . These arguments explain the logic
behind pentry (). Next, the expected payo¤ of type e in equilibrium is [uI(e; )   pentry ()]
where
uI(e; ) =  () + (1  ) maxfe + =;  ()g: (35)
Notice that N > W

C() 
()  )  () > pentry (), which means uI(e; )   pentry () > 0 for alle  0.
Finally, I support the equilibrium by assuming that for any deviation  6= , the boards and
the market maker assume that the rm is a nontarget. Therefore, the board does not change
the status quo and market maker quotes a price  upon exit. Under these o¤-equilibrium
beliefs, the investors prot from deviation is zero if  >  and [   pentry ()] < 0 if  < 
(notice that W C () > , and therefore, p

entry () > ). Therefore, no deviation is protable,
as required.
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